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The Timing and Funding
of Fedwire Funds
Transfers
he timing of payments across the Fedwire Funds Transfer 
service exhibits a regular pattern over the course of the day, 
with payment activity peaking in the late afternoon.1 This pattern 
can be explained, in part, by the fact that banks derive benefits 
from coordinating the timing of their payment activity. Many 
payments made by banks during the day are offsetting. By 
synchronizing payments, banks can take advantage of incoming 
funds to make outgoing payments. The afternoon peak in activity 
reflects, to some extent, banks’ coordination of payment timing 
in an attempt to tap this funding source.
A full explanation of the timing of funds transfers 
recognizes two factors that affect banks’ intraday liquidity 
management. First, the timing of banks’ payment activity 
reflects underlying customer demand. For example, 
settlement of financial transactions customarily takes place in 
the late afternoon, which tends to cause a demand for 
payments late in the day. Second, such timing also reflects a 
bank’s response to customer demand for prompt payment. 
When responding to this demand, banks incur costs that take 
up expensive liquidity resources—either deposits at, or 
overdrafts from, the Federal Reserve System.
The liquidity cost of making a payment varies with the amount 
of coordination involved in payment timing. During periods of 
heavy payment traffic, a bank can, to a greater extent, fund an 
outgoing payment with incoming payments. Conversely, during 
off-peak times, a bank must rely more on account balances or 
overdrafts to fund payments, which increases the cost of making 
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• The dollar value of payments made over the 
Fedwire Funds Transfer service reaches its 
highest level between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. 
each day.
• This peak in payment activity likely reflects 
efforts by banks to synchronize their outgoing 
payments with the large payment inflows they 
expect to receive in the late afternoon.
• By using the incoming transfers to fund 
outgoing payments, banks avoid the more 
costly alternatives of drawing down their 
account balances at the Federal Reserve 
or using overdraft credit. 
• To support the banks’ funding strategy, 
policymakers might establish formal 
“synchronization periods” and encourage 
banks to concentrate payments during 
these periods. 
• The resulting increase in payment 
coordination could further reduce financing 
costs and minimize the number and duration 
of overdrafts.
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a payment. As a result, banks are induced to time their payments 
to coincide with an activity peak, thereby reinforcing the peak. 
Such behavior can lead to the observed aggregate patterns during 
periods of light as well as heavy payment activity.
In this article, we measure banks’ alternative funding 
sources for Fedwire funds transfers throughout the day, using 
a data set that includes all banks’ Fedwire funds transfers and 
Federal Reserve System deposits. This approach allows us to 
gauge the importance of incoming payments as a source of 
funding. We find that incoming payments used by banks to 
offset outgoing payments that are entered within the same 
minute account for 25 percent of the value of these transfers 
during normal activity periods and as much as 40 percent 
during peak periods.
This level of payment coordination is impressive. 
However, economic analyses suggest that activity 
coordination by subjects in similar environments typically 
falls short of the level that would allow the subjects to 
benefit fully from such coordination.2 Accordingly, with 
many thousands of banks participating in Fedwire, there is 
reason to believe that the banks would prefer even greater 
coordination of payment activity. Furthermore, greater 
synchronization of payments would lead to a decrease in 
daylight overdrafts extended by the central bank. With these 
considerations in mind, we also examine a policy that might 
allow banks to coordinate their payment activity even more 
effectively: the creation of activity periods that would serve 
as “focal times” for entering payments.
Our study proceeds as follows. In the next section, we 
review the intraday pattern of Fedwire funds transfers. We 
then offer possible explanations for this pattern by examining 
a model of payment timing. Next, we measure the different 
sources of Fedwire funding during the day. Finally, we discuss 
the implications of our findings for various policy issues, 
including the expansion of the operating hours of the Fedwire 
Funds Transfer service and the facilitation of payment 
coordination.
The Timing of Fedwire Payments
Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, in 
which payment requests are processed and settled by the 
Federal Reserve System as soon as they are initiated by 
banks. The number of funds transfers sent per minute varies 
over the course of the day in a fairly predictable pattern. The 
average minute-by-minute patterns of the number of 
transfers for April 1997, 1998, and 1999 appear in Chart 1.3 
We see that a flurry of payments occurs at 8:30 a.m., which 
used to be the opening time for the Fedwire Funds Transfer 
service. After this flurry, the number of transfers sent per 
minute falls to a much lower level around 9:30 a.m. From 
that trough, the number of transfers grows fairly steadily 
throughout the day, reaching a peak from 2:30 to 4:30 in the 
afternoon. Transaction volume declines rapidly after
4:30 p.m. and approaches zero transfers per minute at the 
close of the service at 6:30 p.m.
The very largest payments are even more concentrated 
late in the day. The patterns of payments above the ninety-
ninth percentile and those below it are shown in Chart 2. 
The chart indicates that for much of the day, there is a fairly 
low level of the largest-value payments. After a sharp 
increase following 4:30 p.m., once the Clearing House 
Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) has closed, the number 
of such payments falls considerably after 5:30 p.m.4 Because 
the largest-value payments constitute in dollar terms the 
bulk of the value transferred by the Funds Transfer service, 
the patterns of these payments strongly influence the 
patterns of value exchanged per minute throughout the day. 
Chart 3 confirms that the value exchanged is more heavily 
concentrated in the period around 4:30 p.m. than is the 
number of funds transfers. Hence, in terms of the number of 
transfers, the dollar value of payments, and the number of 
largest-value payments, we can place the peak period for the 
Fedwire Funds Transfer service at 2:30 to 5:30 p.m., with the 
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Durability of Payment Patterns
The Fedwire Funds Transfer service expanded its hours of 
operation from ten to eighteen hours in December 1997, so 
that it is now open from 12:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. eastern time. 
The change was made mainly to accommodate potential earlier 
settlement of foreign exchange trades. However, neither the 
timing of activity peaks nor the timing of any other payment 
patterns has been significantly affected by the lengthening of 
the Fedwire day.
The primary difference in payment patterns before and after 
December 1997 is the decrease in the number of payments made 
at 8:30 a.m.: there has been a decline equal to about 0.5 percent of 
the number of payments made between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. Yet the 
percentage of funds transfers made between 12:30 a.m. and 
8:30 a.m. remains roughly 1 percent, so some of the activity that 
took place at the 8:30 a.m. opening now takes place prior to that 
time. Overall, there has been a slight increase in the share of the 
value of payments completed by noon: for the period April-
November 1998, 13.75 percent of the value was completed by that 
time, compared with 13.30 percent for the same period in 1997.
Some evidence suggests that the afternoon peak is higher 
today than it was prior to the implementation of the pricing of 
daylight overdrafts in 1987. Richards (1995), for example, 
notes that the share of value transferred by noon dropped 
about 5 percent in the year following the imposition of 
overdraft fees. In addition, a report by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (1987) of large-value funds transfers during a 
single day in 1986 shows a less concentrated pattern of payment 
activity during the day. Using data from the report, we 
compare the percentage of the day’s payments completed 
during various times of the day in 1986—prior to the 
imposition of overdraft fees—with the timing of payments in 
1999 (Chart 4). We see that a larger share of the day’s payments 20 The Timing and Funding of Fedwire Funds Transfers
was completed earlier in the day in 1986 than in 1999 (although 
after 5:30 p.m., payments were made more quickly in 1999). At 
the same time, it is clear that in 1986 there was a substantial 
concentration of payments in the late afternoon. In short, the 
evidence confirms that payment traffic has long been 
characterized by a late afternoon peak.
Liquidity Externalities and the 
Coordination of Payments
Why are payments, especially the largest ones, concentrated in 
the late afternoon? As noted, this phenomenon may result from 
the timing of payment requests by customers and from the 
payments generated by the banks’ own financial activity, which 
may be concentrated at the end of the day so that banks can 
settle financial market trades. In addition, banks themselves 
may time the submission of payments to coincide with the 
incoming payments that they expect to receive late in the day.5 
To explain this latter possibility, we first describe the funding 
sources for a bank’s payments.
Sources of Payment Funding
Banks face a budget constraint when making payments: those 
made in a real-time gross settlement system run by a central 
bank typically are made by transfer of deposit account balances 
held at the central bank. Although a bank may have other 
assets, RTGS systems generally require that funds be in an 
account in the system at payment time, so that the systems do 
not have to rely on other forms of bank assets.6 Account 
balances, then, serve as one source of funds by which a bank 
can make payments. However, account balances at central 
banks usually pay low interest rates, which creates an incentive 
for banks to minimize the amount of funds on account there.7
In the Fedwire Funds Transfer service, as in many other 
RTGS systems, banks transfer their account balances to make 
payments. Of course, one could reasonably ask, what if a bank’s 
account balance falls to zero? For banks that are allowed to 
incur daylight overdrafts, that form of credit from the central 
bank is an additional source of funds that can be used for 
payments.8 Finally, if a bank receives a payment from another 
system participant, that payment replenishes its account 
balance and allows the bank to make outgoing payments. A 
recent report on RTGS systems described these funding sources 
as: “(a) balances maintained on account with the central bank, 
(b) incoming transfers from other banks, [and] (c) credit 
extensions from the central bank.”9
 Before we discuss liquidity externalities in an RTGS system, 
we should look more closely at these three sources of funding. 
In particular, we consider incoming transfers from other 
banks. As noted earlier, when a bank exhausts its account 
balances at a particular time, it can make additional payments 
(without borrowing) if it receives incoming transfers from 
other banks. But because banks receive incoming payments 
and make outgoing payments throughout the day, it is 
important to examine the extent to which banks use incoming 
payments to fund the outgoing ones. We adopt the view that 
incoming payments arriving at roughly the same time as 
offsetting outgoing payments serve as a source of funding for 
the outgoing payments. Conversely, we also adopt the view that 
incoming transfers that “sit” in the receiver’s account for a long 
period of time do not fund specific payments. If incoming 
payments sit in such an account, then we consider payments 
made long after the bank has received funds as being made by 
the transfer of balances maintained at the central bank.
Coordination of Payment Timing
It may be surprising to learn that the synchronous receipt of 
incoming transfers is a legitimate source of funding for a bank. 
This possibility exists whenever banks exchange payments 
throughout the day. For example, assume that Bank A owes 
Bank B $100, Bank B owes Bank C $75, and Bank C owes Bank A 
$50. If these payments took place at different times (in this 
sequence), Bank A’s balance, for example, would fall by $100 in the 
first period and then would rise by $50 in the third. However, if 
these payments took place simultaneously, Bank A, which owes 
$100, would see its deposit balance fall by only $50 because it 
would receive a $50 payment from Bank C. In this way, the receipt 
of the incoming transfer from Bank C allows Bank A to “fund” its 
$100 payment—half with its own deposit balance and half with 
incoming funds. Although the end-of-day balance for all of the 
banks would be the same in either scenario, the uncoordinated 
timing of payments requires the banks either to incur larger 
overdrafts for a longer period or to maintain higher levels of 
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The Effect of Synchronization on the Changes in Bank Balances
deposits to avoid overdrafts, relative to the synchronous timing of 
payment. If Banks A, B, and C could all coordinate the timing of 
their payments, each would have a lower funding cost than it 
would have had it been the first bank to pay. The exhibit presents 
the effect of synchronization on the change in the balances of the 
banks as they make these payments.
It is important to note that, in this regard, what is true for 
banks is also true for their customers. Banks impose limits on 
their customers’ overdrafts and charge fees for the use of 
overdraft credit. Customers, like banks, try to seek the lowest 
cost funding for their payments. The timing of payments 
among bank customers therefore can lead to similar benefits 
for them. In particular, as customers receive payments, they 
can send payments using the incoming funds to avoid (or to 
limit the size of) overdrafts. In this way, payment coordination 
can reduce the customer’s costs of making payments. We saw 
in Chart 4 that a noticeable peak existed in Fedwire payments 
prior to the imposition of overdraft fees by the Federal Reserve 
System. That pattern likely reflects, to some extent, the 
coordination of customer payments as well as the underlying 
timing of other late-in-the-day customer demand, such as for 
making settlement payments in the financial markets.
Although the exhibit illustrates the benefit of coordinating 
payment timing, the difficulty of achieving such a synch-
ronized pattern is considerable because the timing of payments 
in some respects resembles a coordination game.10 Banks can 
benefit by entering payments simultaneously to Fedwire, but 
they typically do not know when their counterparties might 
send offsetting payments. Hence, there is the potential for 
miscoordination. For instance, one bank enters a payment 
expecting to receive, but in fact does not get, an offsetting 
payment. Or two banks each delay sending their payments, 
as one expects the other to send its payment first. In these 
examples, coordination could be achieved simply by 
establishing conventions, such as sending payments regularly 
at a particular time, day after day. The 4:30 p.m. peak in 
payment activity might represent such a convention. When 
banks repeatedly send payments to one another day after day, 
the repetition in payment patterns can in some cases lead to 
successful coordination among a bank and its counterparties.
By concentrating payments in a short period, banks can 
work to resolve the coordination problem. They can then delay 
sending customer requests during the day, provided that the 
delay is not too costly, if they anticipate that other banks will 
make their payments later in the day (either because of 
customer requests or because other banks are also anticipating 
that their counterparties will send payments later in the day). 
As more and more banks behave in this manner, a peak period 
of payment activity will emerge during which banks receive 
payments more frequently than they do at other times. With 
Synchronization of payments . . . allows 
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these incoming payments, each receiving bank will see its 
Fedwire balance increase, enabling it to make its own payments 
and in turn replenishing the balances of the banks to which it 
sends funds. Synchronization of payments thus allows banks to 
tap incoming transfers from other banks as a key source of 
funding.
It is possible, however, that the amount of synchronization 
is less than ideal. The Fedwire Funds Transfer service has many 
thousands of participating banks, and each day their payment 
flows are at least slightly different from the previous day’s 
flows. In this environment, a bank may be unaware of 
incoming funds that may be arriving from a bank with which it 
rarely exchanges payments. The two banks therefore might not 
coordinate the timing of their payments as successfully as they 
might have if they had full information or if they exchanged 
payments regularly. Furthermore, economic analyses of similar 
environments suggest that the participants rarely can 
coordinate well enough to take advantage of the full benefits 
of coordination, even with full information. Often, the 
participants coordinate less fully than they would prefer. 
Repetition of the situation tends to increase the amount 
of coordination achieved, while the inclusion of more 
participants tends to decrease the amount. Although none 
of these analyses has been repeated as frequently as the number 
of times in which a day’s Fedwire payments occur, none has 
involved as many participants as there are Fedwire banks. 
Therefore, the amount of payment coordination among banks 
is conceivably less than desirable.
Measurement of the Different
Payment Funding Sources
during the Day
We now consider what practical application these observations 
hold for the Fedwire Funds Transfer service. To accomplish 
this, we begin by choosing appropriate measures of the 
different funding sources. Then, using Federal Reserve System 
data, we can assess the degree to which banks participating in 
Fedwire use these sources to make payments and we can track 
that usage at different times of the day. Our goal is to confirm 
that during the peak activity period, banks fund a larger share 
of their payments with incoming transfers from other banks 
than they do at any other time of the day.
We measure the sources of funding available to banks as 
follows, beginning with the extension of daylight funds 
overdrafts. To assess fees for banks’ use of daylight credit, 
the Federal Reserve measures overdrafts using the Daylight 
Overdraft Reporting and Pricing System.11 Only those overdrafts 
outstanding at fifty-nine seconds after the minute are included in 
the overdraft fee calculations (Box A describes the calculation of 
daylight overdraft charges). We adopt a similar method for 
measuring overdrafts as a funding source for bank payments: we 
measure the extension of daylight funds overdrafts in terms of the 
amount by which a bank’s balance falls below zero (or below its 
negative balance of the previous minute) at the end of a minute, 
measured on a minute-by-minute basis throughout the day for all 
banks.12 In other words, this source of funding measures the 
amount by which a bank’s payments during a minute cause its 
account balance to fall into (or further into) a negative position.
Our measure of incoming transfers of other banks depends 
on the time of receipt of the transfer. If the incoming transfer 
quickly offsets an outgoing one, we consider the incoming 
transfer to be a source of funding for the outgoing payment. 
More specifically, our measure of this source of funding is the 
value of incoming payments that offset outgoing payments 
within a minute. We adopt this definition because of its 
relationship to the Federal Reserve’s method of measuring 
overdrafts when assessing fees. As described above, our 
measure of payments made by overdrafts is based on the 
amount of overdrafts outstanding at the end of the minute. For 
that reason, we choose to measure incoming payments that 
offset outgoing payments made within the same minute as those 
that fund outgoing payments. Those incoming payments either 
prevent the extension of an overdraft that will be included in 
the bank’s fee calculation or prevent a reduction in the bank’s 
maintained account balance (exact definitions of the variables 
appear in the appendix).13 In other words, this source of 
funding is the value of the payments a bank makes during a 
minute that, because of funds received during that minute, 
do not reduce its account balance.
After accounting for the payments made by the extension of 
overdraft credit from the Federal Reserve System and those 
made by the receipt of incoming transfers from other banks, we 
assign the remaining payments to banks’ maintained account 
balances at the Federal Reserve. In other words, this source of 
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funding is the value of all payments made during a minute that 
result in a reduced, but positive, balance in a bank’s account. 
The sum of all these sources of funding equals the sum of 
payments sent in each minute.
Our measures of the different sources of intraday funds are 
shown in Chart 5, which depicts the average amounts of each 
funding source for all Fedwire funds transfers for March 18, 
April 5, May 13, and June 17, 1999.14 The outside line of the 
chart indicates the gross payments made by minute of the day. 
The interior lines denote the amount of payments made with 
the three possible sources of funding. It is clear that the 
utilization of each source varies over the day. In particular, we 
see a considerable increase in the funding of payments by 
incoming payments of other banks (arriving in the same 
minute) during the late afternoon peak. This effect was 
anticipated by our model (and by our discussion), which 
suggests that banks coordinate payment timing during the peak 
afternoon period to take advantage of this funding source.
The shares of the various sources of funding throughout the 
day are depicted in Chart 6. Early in the day, nearly all 
Box A
Calculation of Daylight Overdraft Chargesa
As of April 14, 1994, each depository institution using the Fedwire 
Funds Transfer and Book-Entry Securities services is charged a fee 
based on the level of daylight overdrafts it incurs. A daylight 
overdraft is a negative account balance that occurs during the 
operating day.
Before describing the calculation of these fees, we note that all 
daylight overdrafts incurred by a depository institution are subject 
to a net debit cap. The cap represents the maximum dollar amount 
of uncollateralized daylight overdrafts that an institution can 
incur.b There are several categories that institutions may fall into 
that govern the amount of the cap, and the Federal Reserve System 
monitors their account balances to ensure that cap violations do 
not occur frequently. 
The Federal Reserve follows three steps when calculating an 
institution’s daylight overdraft fee on a particular day:
· First, the average per-minute overdraft incurred by the 
institution on that day is computed. To do this, the Federal 
Reserve uses the Daylight Overdraft Reporting and Pricing 
System to record all negative end-of-minute balances (fifty-
nine seconds after the minute). These negative balances are 
added for the institution for all the minutes of the day in which 
it has had an overdraft (positive end-of-minute balances are 
not used to offset negative balances). This sum is divided by 
the number of minutes in a standard Fedwire day to arrive at 
the average daily overdraft. Since the expanded operating 
hours began, a standard Fedwire day runs from 12:30 a.m. to 
6:30 p.m. eastern time, for a total of 1,081 minutes.
· Second, the average daily overdraft is multiplied by the fee that 
the Federal Reserve imposes on daylight overdrafts. Currently, 
this effective rate equals 15 basis points—or 18/24—an 
annualized rate of 36 basis points. This effective rate is the 
annualized rate multiplied by the fraction of the day during 
which Fedwire operates. To determine the effective daily rate, 
the Federal Reserve multiplies this number by 1/360. The fee 
multiplied by the average daily overdraft yields the gross 
overdraft charge.
· Third, institutions have a deductible, which is a level of 
overdrafts that they can incur without having to pay a fee. It 
allows an institution some flexibility in its liquidity 
management. The deductible is equal to 10 percent of the 
institution’s qualifying capital for daylight overdrafts. The 
value of the deductible is subtracted from the gross overdraft 
charge to yield the daily charge to an institution. To determine 
the value of the deductible, the Federal Reserve multiplies the 
deductible by a daily effective rate, as in the calculation in the 
previous bullet. However, there is one difference in the 
calculations: although the annual rate by which the threshold 
is valued is also 36 basis points, the fraction of the day is 
multiplied by 10/24, rather than by 18/24.
After ascertaining each of the above parameters, the Federal 
Reserve multiplies the average per-minute overdraft by the 
effective daily rate charged for overdrafts. The value of the 
institution’s deductible is then subtracted from this gross daily 
charge to arrive at the daily overdraft charge assessed.
The Federal Reserve calculates this daily overdraft charge for each 
day and totals the charges over a two-week reserve maintenance 
period. If the sum of the daily overdraft charges incurred during these 
two weeks is less than $25, the fee is waived.
aThis section is based on Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1998).
bAn institution may choose to increase its capacity for daylight 
overdrafts by pledging collateral, but this collateral is applied to 
overdrafts related to book-entry securities only. Overdrafts related
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payments are made by the transfer of maintained balances or 
by the use of funds overdrafts extended by the Federal Reserve. 
As the day progresses, these sources continue to predominate. 
Finally, as the afternoon payment peak gets under way, 
incoming payments from other banks that offset outgoing 
payments within the minute become an important component 
of payment funding. When payments are highly concentrated, 
as they are between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m., this (inexpensive) 
source of funding is the most available and the most utilized. 
For example, between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m., 16 percent more 
payment value is funded by incoming payments within the 
minute than is funded between 2:30 and 4:30 p.m. Overall,
35.6 percent of funds transfers are funded by the movements 
of maintained balances, 39.0 percent are funded by the 
extension of funds overdrafts, and 25.4 percent are funded 
by incoming payments within the minute.
Chart 7 displays the value of the incoming payments that 
offset outgoing payments within the minute across the four 
sample days, illustrating both the pattern of funding and the 
stability of that pattern across the sample days. The 
correlation between the series in Chart 7 averages .907, 
indicating that payment activity is highly predictable.
Of course, our measure of the payments funded by 
incoming funds might be considered conservative. For 
example, a bank that receives an incoming payment three or 
five minutes after making a large payment may still be 
satisfied that the payment was accomplished with less 
expense than it would have been if an offsetting payment 
had not arrived until hours later. To gauge how a longer 
period might affect our measure of funding, we compare 
the amounts of incoming payments that offset outgoing 
payments within a fifteen-minute period and within a one-
minute period (Chart 8). Again, we see a strong pattern: 
during the peak period, offsetting payments are matched (in 
time) more effectively than at any other time during the day. 
This pattern leads to lower payment costs during the peak 
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Sensitivity of the Offsetting of Incoming
and Outgoing Payments to the
Concentration of Payments
The calculation of an elasticity measure offers another way to 
examine the sensitivity of the value of incoming payments as a 
funding source to the concentration of payments. Box B 
displays a fitted relationship between the percentage of 
payments within a minute that are matched by incoming 
payments and the percentage of the day’s payments that occur 
in that minute. We find that a quadratic equation fits the data 
better than a linear relationship does. Using the fitted 
relationship, we see that the elasticity of the percentage of 
payments made by incoming payments that offset outgoing 
payments within the minute to the concentration of payments 
at the median minute of activity across the four sample days is 
0.25. The elasticity initially rises as the concentration of 
payments rises, and averages approximately 0.55 between 
4:30 and 5:30 p.m. This elasticity implies that if 1 percent of 
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Sensitivity of Funding by Incoming Payments to Payment Concentration
Variables
: The percentage of the value of minute  ’s 
payments that are offset by incoming payments.
: The percentage of the value of the 
day’s payments that are conducted in minute  .
Fitted Equation
 =   +    
+   +  .
The parameters  ,  , and   are to be estimated using 
the four days of activity used in the construction of Charts 6-8 in 
the text, and   is an error term. The estimated equation is given by:




The standard errors of the parameter estimates are in 
parentheses. All of the estimated parameters are significant at the
1 percent level. The F value for the equation is 1415 and the 
adjusted R2 is .39.
The fitted equation is increasing for all levels of 
 between [0, .01026]. The average of  
during the peak hour between 4:30 and 
5:30 p.m. is .00521. In fewer than twenty minutes out of the 
4,324 observations does   exceed .01026.
This equation suggests that there is a strongly positive 
relationship between the degree to which payments offset 
within a minute, and the concentration of payments within 
that minute, throughout most of the range of the sample. 
This equation leads to an elasticity of   
with respect to   equal to 0.55 during 
the peak period of payment activity. The elasticity is positive 
in the concentration of payments over the sample, as shown 
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volume to minutes of the hour from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m., there 
would be a net gain of approximately 0.30 percent in the 
proportion of payments funded by the matching of offsetting 
payments. That is, while 0.25 percent of the matching of 
offsetting payments would be lost from the median minutes of 
payment activity, 0.55 percent would be gained during the peak 
hour, for a net increase of 0.30 percent.
It is important to recognize that this relationship is fitted 
“within-sample”—that is, it is not a forecast of what would 
happen should more concentration of payments occur. 
Instead, it records statistically the relationship between the 
concentration, or synchronization, of payments, and the 
amount of funding by incoming payments that accompanies 
that synchronization in the sample days. Within the sample, 
the positive relationship between concentration of payments 
and the matching of offsetting payments suggests that by 
synchronizing payments, one has an effective way to tap this 
source of funding.
Discussion
The realization that the concentration of payments 
occurring late in the day may reflect the resolution of a 
coordination problem suggests that the pattern is stable and 
durable. With regard to the recently extended early morning 
hours of the Fedwire Funds Transfer service, one of the 
difficulties faced in encouraging more payments to be made 
during these hours is how to raise the expectations of banks 
that many other banks will also enter payments then. This is 
a chicken-and-egg problem: until many payments are 
actually made early in the morning, any individual early 
payment will rely more on overdrafts or account balances 
and therefore will be more expensive, at the margin, than if 
it was made later in the day.15 This general situation is likely 
to be faced by new systems planning to operate at that time, 
such as the one proposed by CLS Bank or the new CHIPS 
system, which would require that Fedwire payments be 
made during the early morning hours. For example, CLS 
Bank proposes settling matched foreign exchange trades at 
the same time across different currencies (see Roscoe [1998] 
or Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [1999] 
for a description). Similarly, the new CHIPS system plans to 
fund an intraday matching system partially with funds sent 
to a special account early in the morning (see Nelson [1998] 
for a description). Participants in such arrangements may 
have to hold additional account balances or utilize more 
overdraft funding to make their early morning payments 
than would be necessary if their payments were designed to 
take place during the peak in activity.
The bunching of payments in the afternoon is in accord 
with our theoretical model: banks are induced to coordinate 
payments to take advantage of potentially offsetting funds. 
The coordination of payment activity—the synchronization 
of payments—reflects banks’ expectations that, as a larger 
number of payments are entered, more of them will be 
offsetting and more may, in part, be funding the settlement 
of other payments. This effect results in a greater use of 
incoming payments to fund outgoing payments, which in 
turn would tend to lessen the reliance on account balances 
or overdrafts to make payments. It saves costs for the banks 
involved and may help to explain the strong peak in 
payment activity.
The decreased reliance on other sources of payment 
funding, including overdrafts from the Federal Reserve, that 
accompanies synchronization of payments not only can 
lower costs for commercial banks, but can also reduce 
the risk of exposure by the Federal Reserve. As banks 
synchronize their payments more closely, the duration of 
overdrafts outstanding would be reduced (and the amount 
of overdrafts would likely fall as well). This relationship is 
clear if one imagines the extreme case of all payments being 
made at the same time: overdrafts would be at a minimum 
level in that the simultaneous entry of all payments would 
make maximum use of offsetting payments.16 The reduction 
in the duration, and possibly the amount, of overdrafts that 
accompanies the increased concentration of payment 
timing would therefore reduce the risk of failure to which 
the Federal Reserve is exposed during the extension of an 
overdraft loan to a bank.
As we have noted, the degree of payment synchronization 
might be less than the ideal amount that banks would 
choose if they could coordinate their payment activity 
successfully. If that is so, a greater effort to coordinate 
payment timing may result in a greater share of the day’s 
payments being funded by the synchronized matching and 
offsetting of payments. As our model suggests, this could be 
an underutilized source of payment funding. If greater 
synchronization could be achieved, payments could be 
made at lower cost and the risk of exposure by the Federal 
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Encouraging Payment Synchronization
If the amount of payment coordination is less than ideal, 
policies that encourage greater coordination of payment 
timing might be useful. Of course, such policies should not be 
coercive, but should instead provide more opportunities for 
banks to coordinate payment timing.
To overcome a lack of payment coordination by banks, the 
central bank could attempt to guide their expectations by creating 
a short period—a focal time—in which banks could expect that 
incoming payments would be entered by other banks. An 
example of such a policy might be the establishment of two ten- 
or twenty-minute “synchronization periods.” During these 
periods, only overdrafts outstanding at the end of the period 
would be entered into a bank’s overdraft fee calculation. Banks 
would not be charged for any overdrafts that they incurred within 
the synchronization periods and repaid prior to the end of the 
periods.17 For example, these periods might operate late in the 
morning and then early in the afternoon peak.18 This policy could 
increase banks’ expectations that many payments, including 
incoming ones, would be entered during the synchronization 
periods. If the policy was successful, a greater percentage of the 
day’s payments would be made within short periods and 
therefore would be offsetting within the periods. Less reliance 
would then be placed on other sources of funding, including the 
extension of overdrafts. In particular, the average duration of 
overdrafts would decline and overall overdrafts, including those 
made within the synchronization periods, would fall.
Potential Problems . . . and Solutions
A policy such as the one just described could conceivably pose 
some problems—yet those problems are not without solutions:
· The high degree of payment bunching at the end of the day 
might increase uncertainty, and could be deleterious to the 
smooth functioning of the federal funds market near the 
end of the day.  The act of timing the synchronization 
periods in the late morning or early in the afternoon 
peak could mitigate any problems of delayed resolution 
of uncertainty. Moreover, as long as the delay in 
anticipation of the periods results in earlier payments on 
average, the periods would help the participants to 
overcome the problem of payment delay.
· If the synchronization period is too short, the successful 
coordination of so many payments could impose a greater 
burden on the system’s equipment.  This problem represents 
a resource cost, in terms of computers as well as  
telecommunications links, of handling a large number of 
payments in a short period of time. A solution to this 
problem may be to increase the length of the synchroni-
zation periods, or perhaps to employ a peak-load pricing 
system that would accurately recover the additional costs 
incurred by the banks that utilize these periods.
· The central bank would be extending overdrafts during 
the synchronization periods but not assessing fees on 
them. Such overdrafts would be made for a slightly 
different purpose and they would not last as long as 
overdrafts extended at other times of the day. In 
addition, one could view the intrasynchronization-
period overdrafts as a cost of achieving the coor-
dination that may lower the overall level and duration 
of daylight overdrafts. Nonetheless, firm overdraft 
caps would be necessary to prevent banks from 
borrowing excessively during the synchronization 
periods. In addition, overdrafts that exceed some 
threshold could be required to be collateralized. 
In this way, if large overdrafts accumulated at any 
time during the day, the central bank’s risk exposure 
would be securely capped.
· Depending on the durability of the existing pattern of 
payments, the synchronization periods might be relatively 
ineffective, attracting few additional payments. The cost 
of implementing the synchronization periods is low. 
Moreover, we would expect that any increase in the 
amount of payment coordination would require some 
time to achieve, as banks adjust to the changing 
opportunities provided by the periods and the behavior 
of their counterparties.
Conclusion
Our review of the timing of Fedwire funds transfers suggests 
that it is reasonable to expect the observed peak in payment 
activity. It is likely that some payment requests are coordinated 
to be entered during a peak period of activity late in the 
afternoon. This pattern is consistent with the outcome of a 
coordination game among the banks (and among their 
customers): as banks synchronize their payments more closely, 
their need for account balances or explicit overdrafts to make 
payments diminishes. This activity makes payments sent 
during the peak less expensive, at the margin, than payments 
sent at other times of the day.
By measuring the funding sources of payments made in the 
Fedwire Funds Transfer service, we found that approximately 
25 percent of a day’s payments are funded by incoming 
payments that offset payments made by banks within the same 
minute. This source of funding is more readily available during 28 The Timing and Funding of Fedwire Funds Transfers
the late-afternoon activity peak, when large-value payments are 
more closely synchronized; such activity accounts for 
approximately 40 percent of payment funding at that time.
Payment synchronization benefits banks through the 
reduced costs of making synchronized payments, but it also has 
other benefits, as it tends to reduce the amount and duration of 
overdrafts from the Federal Reserve System. The extension of 
an overdraft creates a slight risk for the Federal Reserve: should 
a borrowing bank fail while an overdraft is outstanding, the 
Federal Reserve would have to seek repayment in bankruptcy 
court. For this reason, the Federal Reserve has adopted policies 
to reduce overdrafts (see Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System [1998] for details). The synchronization of 
payments is another potential tool for the Federal Reserve to 
reduce both overdrafts and their duration.
However, the synchronization process, in its current form, 
may be less than ideal for the Fedwire system’s participants. 
With that in mind, and with the goal of reducing the extent and 
duration of overdrafts, we considered a policy initiative that 
could assist banks in synchronizing their payments. The 
initiative would create synchronization periods in the late 
morning and early in the current activity peak. During these 
periods, banks could run intrasynchronization-period 
overdrafts and not face any charges for them. Banks could be 
encouraged to enter more payments during these periods, 
which would lead to reduced payment funding costs and a 
decreased reliance on overdraft funding during the day.
Finally, many countries recently have adopted real-time 
gross settlement systems for large-value payments.19 RTGS 
systems offer many advantages in managing risk and in linking 
payment flows with securities markets and other payment 
systems in a timely fashion. It is important, therefore, to 
understand better the economic incentives and behavior of 
participants in an RTGS system. We have focused on the issue 
of how the cost of liquidity in an RTGS system is affected by the 
timing of a bank’s payment activity, but many other issues 
remain to be investigated. With better availability of data—
and with a range of system designs now operating across 
countries—the potential for further research into these systems 
is greater than ever.Appendix: Definition of Variables
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Dollar value of payments made by Bank   to Bank   in minute  :
.
Funds balance of Bank   at the end of minute  :
,
where   is the balance in the bank’s account at the Federal 
Reserve at the start of the day.
Extension of daylight funds overdrafts:
:  and  .
Dollar value of payments funded by offsetting incoming 
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We decompose the funding of gross payments in minute   
into the following sources:
.
The last category,  , consists of those 
payments funded by the transfer of balances maintained in 
banks’ accounts (for more than a minute) at the Federal 
Reserve.
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1. Fedwire is a large-value payment system owned and operated by the 
Federal Reserve System. Two services are associated with Fedwire: the 
Funds Transfer service and the Book-Entry Securities service. In this 
article, we focus on the Funds Transfer service, which allows a 
depository institution to transfer funds from an account held at a 
Federal Reserve Bank to the account of any other Fedwire Funds 
Transfer service participant.
2. See van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) for an example of such 
an analysis.
3. Throughout this article, the dates chosen for the various calcu-
lations were governed by the availability of data at the time the 
calculations were performed. Here, April data are used because April 
was the most recent full month for which data were available.
4. CHIPS, operated by CHIPCo, is a large-value deferred netting 
system that settles at 4:30 p.m. Banks face constraints within CHIPS 
on their net debit positions and may be uncertain as to whether a 
particular payment can be settled over CHIPS. If a payment does not 
satisfy the constraints during the operating hours of CHIPS, banks 
tend to send the payment over Fedwire when CHIPS closes.
5. Angelini (1998) and Kobayakawa (1997) consider alternative 
models of payment timing in a real-time gross settlement system.
6. Of course, a bank can sell other assets and add to its account 
balances at the central bank.
7. Reserve balances at the Federal Reserve are charged a zero 
interest rate and are determined by reserve requirements on the 
amount of certain deposits at the participating bank. Participating 
banks receive earning credits on their required clearing balances at 
the Federal Reserve; these credits are not transferable to third 
parties. 
8. Banks using the Fedwire Funds Transfer service must stay within 
their “debit cap,” which limits the amount by which they can overdraft 
their account. Some banks have a zero debit cap, which means that 
they cannot overdraft their accounts at all.
9. Bank for International Settlements (1997). The report included a 
fourth category: “(d) borrowing from other banks through the money 
markets,” which we include as part of (a).
10. A coordination game is a social situation in which there are gains 
to the participants from coordinating their actions—such as everyone 
in the United States driving on the right-hand side of the road or 
adhering to a uniform calendar of holidays. A model of a payment 
timing decision that results in a coordination game is available from 
James McAndrews.
11. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1998) for a 
description of the measurement of overdrafts for assessing overdraft fees.
12. Note that we are measuring only funds-related overdrafts. Daylight 
overdrafts created in a transaction involving book-entry securities are 
not considered. See Box A for details.
13. To calculate the amount of offsetting payments, we use an 
intraminute “netting ratio,” which is the ratio of gross payments sent in 
a given period to the net change in balances required to make those 
payments within the period. In our earlier example, only $50 had to be 
transferred from Bank A to settle all $225 worth of payments. There, the 
netting ratio is (225/50) = 4.5, indicating the dollar’s worth of payments 
being made per dollar of deposit funds. A high netting ratio indicates 
that there is a high degree of offset among the payments being made 
during the period. We then measure the amount of offsetting payments 
as  . See the appendix for 
a more complete explanation.
14. The days represent a sample from a set of days for which we have 
collected bank balance and overdraft data. For each month between 
March and June 1999, two days were randomly chosen as days for 
which data were collected.
15. Stehm (1998) points out this issue when reviewing early morning 
payment activity.
16. We performed a simulation of a multibank payment system 
with a random distribution of payments across banks. Moving 
from a situation in which banks spread payments evenly across 
several periods to a situation in which payments are all made at the 
same time, the overdrafts of the system fall, and are of reduced 
duration as payments are concentrated in fewer periods. 
17. This policy can be interpreted as a special case of time-varying 
pricing for overdrafts. That is, banks would not be charged for 
overdrafts incurred during a synchronization period but would be 
assessed fees for overdrafts at other times, including the overdrafts 
outstanding at the close of the synchronization period.
gross payments () * 1 1 netting ratio ¤ () – ()Endnotes (Continued)
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18. Our analysis suggests that attempts to alter the timing of the 
afternoon peak drastically would not be very effective. Placing the 
synchronization periods at these particular times—in the late 
morning or early in the afternoon peak—would encourage banks 
to send more payments then.
19. See Bank for International Settlements (1997).References
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